



The London P&I Club

STOP Loss

OCTOBER 2014 | ISSUE 63

CAPPUCCINO BUNKERS

The Cappuccino effect may be described essentially as the frothing or bubbling effect caused by compressed air blown through the delivery hose. The aerated bunkers when sounded will give the impression that the fuel is delivered as ordered. In fact, after some time when the entrapped air in suspension settles out of the fuel oil, the oil level drops and a shortfall is discovered.

Precautions against Cappuccino Bunkers

Before Fuel Transfer

- During usual gauging of bunker barge tanks, fuel oil from ullage hatches should be visually checked for any foam on the surface.
- Foam may also be detected on the ullage tape.
- If entrained air is suspected on the tape or fuel surface, obtain a sample and pour into a clean glass jar and observe carefully for signs of foam or bubbles. If the suspicion is confirmed, the Chief Engineer should not start bunkering and should notify the Owners/Charterers immediately.

During and After Fuel Transfer

Air can also be introduced in the fuel during the pumping period, so it is important to continue gauging the ship's tanks as air bubbles would be readily seen on the sounding tape. As stripping and line blowing can also introduce air, stripping should only be performed at the end of the delivery for a short period of time and line blowing kept to a minimum. The ship's bunker manifold valve should be checked shut before gauging of the ship's tanks.



Identifying Cappuccino Bunkers

- Signs of froth/foam on the surface of the fuel in the barge tanks during opening gauge
- Excessive bubbles on the sounding tape prior to, during and after bunkering
- Bunker hose jerking or whipping around
- Slow delivery rates than those agreed
- Gurgling sound in vicinity of bunker manifold
- Fluctuations of pressure on manifold pressure gauge
- Unusual noises from the bunker barge

Kaivan H. Chinoy,
Founder & Principal Marine Loss Control
Advisor of Bunker Detective



SAFETY POSTER UPDATE

The Club announced its new safety poster range in *StopLoss* issue 62, and we are happy to report that we are well underway with our task of contacting all of our entered fleets to establish each Member's requirements.

In the meantime, if we have not yet contacted you and you wish to receive posters, please write to us at: publications@londonpandi.com

Please note that the three posters on the subjects of safe movement around the ship, fire drills and gas detection equipment are available in English, Mandarin and Vietnamese.

IN THIS ISSUE

VOYAGE DATA
RECORDER & CLAIMS

SHIP INSPECTION

CLUB INSPECTOR



Voyage Data Recorder and claims



The Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) is now an established item of bridge equipment. The London P&I Club's Ship Inspection Programme results in this area would confirm that the operation of these units on entered ships is generally well understood.

However, there are instances where the Master of an entered ship has failed to perform the steps required to preserve VDR data in the event of an incident; or failed to recognise circumstances in which VDR data (particularly voice traffic on VHF and on the bridge) may be very valuable in the defence of a claim.

In our first example, a ship heading into port was presented with a 'head-on' situation as described in Rule 14 of the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea. Though a departure from the 'Rules', a deal was struck on the VHF between the two ships. Due to the location of the entered ship's intended berth, an alteration of course to port was to occur. Both ships subsequently collided, resulting in a considerable claim upon the Club.

The Master did not save the VDR data – it is presumed because the data could be incriminating and used against him. Unfortunately, while the same information was not likely to reverse any liability for the incident, it may have been useful evidence to assist in reaching an amicable settlement. The effect on the settlement of the claim cannot now be quantified, though it stands to reason that the Member would have preferred the Master to have saved the information. In an attempt to protect himself, the Master may have exposed his Owners to a larger settlement.

Emergency Guidance Manuals onboard usually contain aide memoir sheets to assist the Master with those structured and ordered tasks which need to be taken in priority order, and are aimed at ensuring steps are not missed in the stress of an emergency. We ask Members to consider the insertion or addition of the VDR data save in such lists as a low priority matter.

Our second example concerns an entered container ship which, due to impeding poor weather, was forced to depart from a container berth without the lashing of many of her containers. Unfortunately, when the ship was exposed to the poor weather a number of the unlashed containers were lost overboard. In some ways understandably, the Master did not consider this situation to be one where VDR data ought to be saved. During the handling of the ensuing claim, the Club feels that the VDR data would have probably represented a valuable narrative of the exchanges between the port authorities and the bridge team and could have helped greatly in the claim negotiation.

We make no particular recommendation other than to hope that these examples bring the matter to the attention of deck officers reading this article.



MASTER'S NIGHT ORDERS

The ship inspection department's Ship Inspection Forms consider various aspects of ship management during routine inspections. The Master's night order book is one of those inspection checks which has been noted as generating an increasing number of "negative findings".

The value of Master's night orders should not be under-estimated in the quest for efficient and safe performance of the ship, particularly during port calls.



Invariably, deep sea Masters function as "day-workers", and with an early morning ETA at the pilot station, there is a great deal for the ship's officers and crew to prepare after a long voyage. Efficient planning in advance can help an operation to be carried out in a controlled and safe manner with the minimum of stress for all parties. The Master's night orders are traditionally a set of bespoke instructions for the overnight bridge officers to digest and act upon to ensure that by the time a ship reaches the pilot station, all required crew are at their stations and all physical preparations are made, and the ship is in all respects ready to enter port.

When writing night orders, the points below could be among the instructions which may be considered by the Master:

- *Call the Master with sufficient time available to appraise the full navigational situation and to develop proper night vision before reaching the pilot station or taking the con.*
- *Call pilot station to confirm ETA and berthing prospects.*
- *Ensure that day crew are called at a reasonable time so items such as anchors are cleared, pilot boarding arrangements are safely in place, and flags/call sign are ready to be run up.*
- *Call duty engineer to ensure that engines are on standby suitably in advance of engines being required for manoeuvring.*
- *Ensure that bridge manning is increased as required.*
- *Ensure that mooring ropes are prepared.*
- *Ensure that bridge arrival checklists are completed and required systems checked.*

House-keeping on deck

Good house-keeping around the ship has always been considered a feature of good seamanship. Untidy store rooms, paint lockers and other spaces can slow down work processes, but can also result in serious accidents.

Inspectors continue to report during ship inspections that heavy items are kept on deck in a poorly secured manner or even unsecured.

The personal injury aspect of loose items on deck in heavy weather can be easily imagined. However, if we look back to the winter of 1993, we can learn from the loss of the *M/T Braer* in the Shetland Islands as an example of how poor house-keeping on deck contributed to a very high-profile casualty and oil spill.

The *Braer* lost power partly because of sea water ingress to bunker tanks via air vents which had been broken by loose pipes sliding across the poop deck in heavy weather. The ship, which was on a passage from Norway to Canada, lost propulsion south of the Shetland Islands, and eventually found herself aground resulting in a significant pollution incident.

The Club would remind readers to consider in sufficient detail the chosen location for storage of steel and other heavy items on deck in the context of the effect of heavy weather. While the case is more than 20 years old, the lessons learned on the subject of house-keeping remain valid today.

A full incident report is available at:
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/braer-text.pdf

Club Inspector

Walter Vervloesem



IMCS – Independent Marine Consultants & Surveyors

IMCS undertakes inspections on new and existing entries on behalf of the London P&I Club across North West Europe. IMCS was founded and set up in Antwerp in 1990 by R. De Graeve. As the workload increased and diversified, Walter Vervloesem (FNI) joined IMCS in 1995, and is today Chairman of the IMCS Group of Companies Ltd (UK). With his specialist ship inspection knowledge, IMCS soon developed relationships with P&I Clubs, H&M underwriters, S&P brokers, banks and Flag states.

Walter comments: "A combination of top-level merchant shipping operational knowledge and experience with steel resulted in IMCS being regularly involved in carrying out ship inspections, investigating steel claims and performing hatch cover surveys on behalf of the London P&I Club."

His knowledge and experience within the dry-bulk sector is neatly illustrated in his popular reference book "Hatch Cover Inspections – A Practical Guide" which is a Nautical Institute Publication and is just one of the publications he has written.

IMCS soon joined forces with SDT International, MacGREGOR and classification societies, which eventually led to SDT International developing the first Class Type Approved ultrasonic tightness testing equipment. Shortly afterwards, Walter developed the Nautical Institute accredited "SDT-IMCS Hatch Cover Training Course", which is given in 10 different locations worldwide every year.

IMCS recognises that there is a need to ensure consistency and quality, and employs an in-house training system, including CBT, to train, support and coach the surveyors of the IMCS Network. Currently, the IMCS Group has a staff of 41 marine surveyors and consultants in 19 countries.

"Throughout the years, IMCS has worked hard to make quality its hallmark, and significant efforts are made every day to ensure high standard performance," says Walter. "Working closely with industry majors like the London P&I Club over the last 20 years is considered a privilege as it allowed us to learn and professionalise further with every case that has been entrusted to us."

Apart from marine survey and consultancy work, IMCS has also helped several industry majors with training and loss prevention initiatives. The most recent example being the development of a ship inspection programme for ArcelorMittal, Marsh and HDI Gerling, which included a dedicated training scheme for inspectors in various countries, ship and trade specific inspection programmes along with a web-based database and rating system.

Walter adds: "Being aware of the fact that we are only as good as our last survey, and in order to recognise and understand our clients' needs and meet with their expectations, we value the principle of going for the extra mile with a smile!"

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION WORLD ROUND-UP

In this regular column, we round up some of the eye-catching accident investigation reports from around the globe:

Stena Alegra MAIB – United Kingdom

An investigation into the dragging and subsequent grounding of the ship in Karlskrona, Sweden. The investigation identified that the Master had decided to anchor the ship in winds that were forecast to increase to the assumed maximum design limit of its anchoring equipment without completing a full assessment of the consequent risks.

http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/StenaAlegra.pdf

Wawasan Ruby NTSB – USA

A collision between the tanker Wawasan Ruby and the CSX Bayside Coal Pier at Baltimore Harbour, Maryland. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the collision of the tanker with the Coal Pier was the speed at which the pilot and the Master were operating the ship while attempting a 70-degree turn.

<http://www.nts.gov/doclib/reports/2014/MAB1407.pdf>

Deutschland FBMCI – Germany

Grounding of the passenger ship *Deutschland*, while in the Beagle Channel (Chile). The report makes various recommendations with respect to Passage Planning and procedures for deviations for planned routes.

http://www.bsu-bund.de/SharedDocs/pdf/EN/Investigation_Report/2014/Investigation_Report_19_12.pdf;jsessionid=F4475857C7A838917C35B0E6C717DAFD.live1043?__blob=publicationFile

Atlantic Princess ATSB – Australia

This is an investigation into the fatality of a company representative during the boarding of the ship by pilot ladder. The ATSB found that while the ship's pilot ladder had been rigged in accordance with the relevant international requirements, no further risk assessment was carried out for the personnel transfer. The investigation also found that the company's SMS provided no guidance relating to actions that should be taken when less experienced personnel were to use a pilot ladder to board or disembark the ship.

<http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4891508/mo-2013-007-final.pdf>



The London P&I Club



Published on behalf of The London Steam Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association by
A. Billbrough & Co. Ltd.,
50 Leman Street, London E1 8HQ, UK.
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7772 8000
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7772 8200
E-mail: stoploss@londonpandi.com
www.londonpandi.com

